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Abstract
In times of acute scarcity, demand for a commodity greatly exceeds its supply. In such
situations, queuing mechanisms are frequently used to allocate scarce goods to citizens.
However, inordinately long queues lead to excessive wait times and this can lead to violence.
As such, the general purpose of this paper is to theoretically analyze the problem of
preventing violence in a queuing context. To this end, we first formulate a queuing model
with a finite capacity. Next, we determine the smallest capacity that will keep the likelihood
of violence below an exogenously specified value. Finally, we illustrate the working of our
model with a simple numerical example.
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See Gunawardana (2000) for a discussion of Sri Lanka.
2
See Wood (1999) for an account of the state of Bihar in India.
3
See Woldie (2003) for a discussion of Nigeria.
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1. Introduction
In many countries and especially in developing countries, it is common to use queuing
mechanisms to allocate commodities or goods to citizens. Examples of goods that are often allocated
in this manner during normal economic times include rice,
1 groundwater,
2 and banking services.
3 A
basic feature of these goods allocation mechanisms is that they involve waiting in line by citizens. In
other words, citizens have to actually wait in queue to obtain the good that is being allocated by either
a public or a private provider. 
These queuing mechanisms take on particular significance during times of acute scarcity
brought on by one or more governmental policies. In fact, during such difficult times, it is frequently
the norm in many developing nations to allocate the available supplies of the relevant scarce goods
by means of the aforementioned queuing mechanisms. What is important for our purpose is that in
times of acute scarcity, demand for a good greatly exceeds its supply. As a result, if a good
characterized by excess demand is to be allocated to citizens by means of a queuing mechanism then,
in the time period of interest, it is important for a public or a private provider to regulate the length
of the queue. Concrete examples from two different countries show why.
In recent times, President Hugo Chavez’s desire to bring the powerful state owned oil
company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) under his influence has caused considerable political
turmoil in Venezuela. As the Economist (Anonymous, 2003a) has reported, there was an acute
shortage of both cooking gas and petrol. As a result, in some provider facilities, there were queues
of citizens that could be measured not in hours but in days. This situation gave rise not only to a
secondary market for places in the fuel queues but it also resulted in considerable economic unrest
and violence. 
As a second example, consider the case of contemporary Zimbabwe. Because of President
Robert Mugabe’s misguided policies, Zimbabwe is in poor economic shape. As a result, many
essential commodities are in short supply and it is routine for both public and the remaining private
providers to allocate these scarce commodities by means of queuing mechanisms. The Economist
(Anonymous, 2002; 2003b) describes instances where queues for essential commodities were so long
that the frustrations of Zimbabwean citizens boiled over and this led, as in Venezuela, to violence.
The examples in the previous two paragraphs tell us why it is essential for a public or a private
provider to regulate the length of the relevant queues. As a referee has suggested, it can be useful to
think of inordinately long queues—that result in excessive wait times—as a necessary condition for4
We are not suggesting that long queues will always lead to violence. In fact, in the next paragraph, we explicitly model this aspect
of the problem by supposing that the occurrence of violence is a probabilistic event. In this regard, it is also helpful to recognize
that in planned economies such as the former Soviet Union and China before 1978, there often were long queues but such queues
did not always lead to violence.
5
See Taylor and Karlin (1998, chapter 9) and Ross (2003, chapter 8) for textbook accounts of Markovian queuing models.
6
In queuing models, it is very common to assume that the service times (in our case the good allocation times) are exponentially
distributed. Indeed, this is the standard assumption in all Markovian queuing models. For more details on this point, see Taylor
and Karlin (1998, pp. 547-557) and Ross (2003, pp. 480-495). In addition, economists analyzing the allocation of goods by queuing
mechanisms have also frequently assumed that the service times are exponential. For a more detailed corroboration of this claim,
see Lui (1985) and Batabyal (2005).
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violence. In addition to this, a deteriorating law and order situation and/or corruption can also lead
to violence.
4 Given this discussion, it is clear that if the provider of a scarce good by means of a
queuing mechanism is to prevent violence then, in the germane time period, (s)he should be able to
regulate the capacity of the queue. Such an action effectively caps the length of the queue and this
prevents the phenomenon of overly long citizen wait times. 
Despite the obvious importance of the question of optimally determining the capacity of a
queue in the context of the allocation of scarce commodities, to the best of our knowledge, this
question has received scant attention in the economics literature. Lui (1985) and more recently
Batabyal and Nijkamp (2004) and Batabyal and Yoo (2004) have used queuing models to analyze
bribery and corruption. Although all three of these cited papers refer to the optimal queue capacity
determination question, they do not explicitly analyze this question from the standpoint of the
prevention of violence. Consequently, the general purpose of our paper is to theoretically analyze the
problem of preventing violence in a queuing context.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates a Markovian queuing
model
5 with finite capacity. Section 3 first determines the smallest capacity that will keep the
likelihood of violence below an exogenously specified value. Next, this section illustrates the working
of our model with a simple numerical example. Section 4 concludes and then discusses three ways
in which the research of this paper might be extended. 
2. The Queuing Theoretic Framework
Consider a particular region within a developing country in a time of acute economic scarcity.
Within this nation, we focus on a public or private provider who is in charge of allocating an essential
but scarce commodity to citizens. It takes this provider a random amount of time to allocate the good
in question to citizens. We suppose that this random allocation time is exponentially distributed with
parameter 
6 To obtain the good under study, citizens arrive at our provider’s facility in accordance β.
with a Poisson process with rate   They then join a queue and wait in this queue until it is their turn α.
to be served by the provider. In the parlance of queuing theory, our provider is the single server and7
Lui (1985) also uses a   model to analyze issues pertaining to bribery and corruption. M/M/1
8
As an example, if our provider would like to keep the likelihood of violence below 0.01 then   and the relevant fraction would x'100
be 1/100. 
9
See Taylor and Karlin (1998, pp. 548-550) and Ross (2003, pp. 478-483) for additional details on this concept.
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we are analyzing a variant of the prominent model known as the   queuing model.
7 M/M/1
To model the problem of preventing violence, suppose that whenever the total number of
citizens in our provider’s facility exceeds a capacity   there is violence because this provider is C,
unable to allocate the commodity in question in a reasonable amount of time. From the perspective
of the waiting citizens, this violence occurs because the queue length is too long and hence the wait
times to obtain the commodity being allocated by our provider are excessive. Now, note that the
occurrence of violence is not a deterministic but a stochastic event. Therefore, we suppose that our
provider would like to keep the likelihood of violence below some exogenously specified value.
Because this exogenously stipulated value is a probability, we can always write this probability as a
fraction   where 
8  1/xx >1.
The reader will note that the focus of our provider is on the length of the queue and the
probability   As such, we have to have some criterion under which the smallest capacity   will 1/x. C
be computed to keep the likelihood of violence below   Given our queuing theoretic approach to 1/x.
the problem of preventing violence, the most reasonable such criterion is the steady state probability
distribution of the queue length.
9 Given this criterion, we are now ready to state the central question
of this paper and that question is this: What is the smallest capacity   that will keep the likelihood C
of violence, under the steady state probability distribution of the queue length, below an exogenously
specified value   We now proceed to answer this question. 1/x?
3. The Prevention of Violence
3.1. Optimal capacity determination
We begin by describing the concept of a steady state probability. To this end, let   be the Y(t)
number of citizens in our provider’s facility at time   Then, the steady state probability   tells us t. Pk
the probability, as time approaches infinity, that there are exactly  citizens in the provider’s facility. k
Mathematically, we have
(1) Pk'limt64Prob{Y(t)'k}, k'0,1,2,...
Now, from equation 2.9 in Taylor and Karlin (1998, p. 549) we conclude that when the citizen arrival
rate to our provider’s facility   is less than the parameter   of the exponentially distributed (α)( β)
random commodity allocation time, steady state probabilities for the queue length exist and they are10
In the remainder of this paper, we assume that   holds. Without this condition, the queue length would be unbounded and, as α<β









We are interested in determining the smallest capacity   that will keep the likelihood of C
violence, under the steady state probability distribution of the queue length, below the exogenously








holds. The inequality in (3) above can be expressed in a more convenient form by first taking the
logarithm and then simplifying the resulting expression. After several steps of algebra, we find that





Inspection of the inequality in (4) tells us that the smallest   we seek depends on the Poisson arrival C
rate   the parameter of the exponentially distributed commodity allocation time   and the (α), (β),
denominator   of the exogenously specified probability    (x)( 1 / x).
We can think of the rate   as a demand parameter. Looked at in this way, the magnitude (α)
of this parameter tells us the level of demand for the good being allocated by our provider. Similarly,
the parameter   can be thought of as an efficiency parameter for the supplier, i.e., the provider. (β)
Interpreted in this way, as the magnitude of   increases, the mean good allocation time decreases (β)
and hence the efficiency of supply increases. The inequality in (4) and this discussion together tell us
that in a time of economic scarcity for the commodity under study, a provider who wishes to keep
the likelihood of violence under the steady state probability distribution of the queue length below 1/x,
will choose the capacity of the queue in such a way so that this capacity plus unity is at least as big
as the ratio on the right-hand-side (RHS) of the inequality in (4). Now, it should be clear to the reader
that the ratio on the RHS of (4) is, in fact, a function of the aforementioned demand and supply
efficiency parameters. We now provide a numerical example to show how our basic result might be
operationalized in a specific circumstance.5
3.2 A numerical example
Suppose that citizens arrive at our provider’s facility in accordance with a Poisson process
with rate   Further, let the parameter of the exponentially distributed commodity allocation time α'2.
be   Finally, suppose that our provider would like to keep the likelihood of violence below 0.001. β'3.
Clearly, 0.001 can be written as 1/1000 and hence  Now substituting   and  x'1000. α'2, β'3, x'1000







It should be clear to the reader that the smallest   must be a positive integer. Therefore, inspection C
of the expression in (5) above tells us that when   the smallest   equals 17. (α, β, x)'(2, 3, 1000), C
In other words, if the likelihood of violence is to be kept below 0.001 then, in the time period of
interest, once seventeen citizens have entered the provider’s facility, (s)he should not allow any more
citizens in.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a theoretical perspective on the violence prevention problem
confronting a public or private provider in times of acute scarcity where queuing mechanisms are used
to allocate essential commodities to citizens. In particular, we first formulated a queuing model with
a finite capacity. Next, we determined the smallest capacity that will keep the likelihood of violence,
under the steady state probability distribution of the queue length, below an exogenously specified
value. Finally, we used a simple numerical example to show how the result of our analysis can be
operationalized in a particular setting.
The analysis of this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. In what follows,
we suggest three potential extensions. First, in times of economic scarcity, quotas are sometimes used
to allocate essential commodities. In our queuing theoretic analysis, the idea of a quota was implicit
but not explicit. To see this clearly, note the following. In the first paragraph of section 2, we said that
it takes a random amount of time to allocate the commodity in question to citizens. One way to
understand why it takes a random amount of time is to suppose that our provider has to first
determine what a particular citizen’s quota for the good in question is and only then is (s)he able to
provide the good to this citizen. A more explicit way of modeling the quota would be to posit that
the provider’s random allocation time is exponentially distributed not with parameter   but with (β)
parameter   where   measures the magnitude of the quota. Inter alia, this way of (qβ), q0(0,1)
modeling the quota would make the allocation time parameter a smaller number and hence the mean
allocation time would be a bigger number to allow for the fact that the commodity in question can
be given to a citizen only after the quota has been determined. Second, we studied one kind of
violence prevention problem, i.e., the prevention of violence stemming from excessive wait times
which in turn arise when queue lengths are inordinately long. A second kind of problem arises when6
citizens who have been shut out from the provider’s facility engage in violent acts to get into the
facility. Consequently, one way to extend the analysis in this paper would be to study a model in
which the possibility of both kinds of violence is explicitly modeled. Finally, we studied a queuing
model in which we implicitly assumed that the provider is not venal. However, as the analyses of Basu
et al. (1992), Kulshreshtha (2003), and others have shown, in many developing countries, this
assumption is untenable. Therefore, it would be useful to extend the model of this paper to include
the case in which citizens pay bribes to increase the admissible length of the queue. Studies that
analyze these aspects of the problem will increase our understanding of the connections between the
allocation of essential commodities by means of queuing mechanisms during difficult economic times
and the problem of preventing violence.7
References
Anonymous. 2002. The Poll that Bob Stole, The Economist, March 14.
Anonymous. 2003a. Pyrrhus of Caracas, The Economist, January 2.
Anonymous. 2003b. The Whiff of Rotting Tyranny, The Economist, January 16.
Basu, K., Bhattacharya, S., and Mishra, A. 1992. Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption,
Journal of Public Economics, 48, 349-359.
Batabyal, A.A., and Nijkamp, P. 2004. Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing
Countries, Economics Bulletin, 15, 1-10.
Batabyal, A.A., and Yoo, S.J. 2004. Corruption, Bribery, and Wait Times in the Public Allocation
of Goods in Developing Countries. Forthcoming, Review of Development Economics.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=545022
Batabyal, A.A. 2005. On Bribing and Balking in a Simple Queuing Model of Resource Allocation,
Unpublished Manuscript, Rochester Institute of Technology.
Gunawardana, P.J. 2000. Concessional Sales, Open Market Demand, and the Consumption of Rice
in Sri Lanka, International Journal of Social Economics, 27, 847-861.
Kulshreshtha, P. 2003. Rationing by Waiting, Opportunity Costs of Waiting and Bribery, Indian
Economic Review, 38, 59-75.
Lui, F.T. 1985. An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, Journal of Political Economy, 93, 760-
781.
Ross, S.M. 2003. Introduction to Probability Models, 8
th edition. Academic Press, San Diego,
California.
Taylor, H.M., and Karlin, S. 1998. Introduction to Stochastic Modeling, 3
rd edition. Academic Press,
San Diego, California.
Woldie, A. 2003. Nigerian Banks—Quality of Services, Journal of African Business, 4, 69-87.
Wood, G. 1999. Private Provision after Public Neglect: Bending Irrigation Markets in North Bihar,
Development and Change, 30, 775-794.